Imaginative Transportation and the Self Box

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1   Introduction

When deeply engaged in a story, you may seem to be transported away from the real world and into the story world. You could read the story from a book or act out the story in a play. Regardless, stories seem to have a transportative power over us. Samuel Kampa puts forth a theory of how stories seem to transport us. He presents three cases to serve as examples throughout his text. In the READER case, Sandra becomes engrossed in reading a book. She begins to think and feel as though she is Frankenstein's monster. In the AGENT case, Meredith is an undercover agent who has infiltrated the ranks of a drug smuggling operation. In the course of her acting and becoming close to the drug lord, she begins to think and feel like she is becoming the drug smuggler she pretends to be. In the GIOVANNI case, John is an actor playing Don Giovanni. In doing so, he starts to think and feel as though he is Don Giovanni.[1] The three cases demonstrate the transportation that stories enable. Kampa refers to this sort of transportation as imaginative transportation. How imaginative transportation works is not immediately clear.

The primary question Kampa seeks to answer is what imaginative transportation is and how it works. Kampa rejects the most obvious options for what imaginative transportation could be: full belief, imaginative pretense, acceptance, alief, in-between belief, and half-belief. For example, John neither beliefs he is nor pretends to be Don Giovanni. He doesn't plainly accept he is Don Giovanni, nor does he alieve he is Don Giovanni. Kampa rejects

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1. Samuel Kampa, "Imaginative Transportation," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 2017, 1–2.

these options in favor of what he calls palief. He defines "palief" as follows: "To palieve that p is to virtually assume a noetic structure that includes p."[2] In contrast to the other options, palief is rationally consistent with contradictory beliefs, is cognitively taxing, requires considerable effort, uses special skills, is thought to serve some practical ends, and effects affective responses.[3] Kampa claims that paliefs are like aliefs in that they are arational, not semantically evaluable, affect-laden, and action-generating. Neither paliefs nor aliefs are reasons-responsive, and neither can be true or false. Palievers and alievers also both feel and act in response to their paliefs and aliefs. Unlike aliefs, paliefs are propositional rather than associative, purposeful rather than automatic, exclusive to persons, and posterior to other attitudes developmentally and conceptually.[4]

While Kampa is explicitly not concerned with imaginative pretense, he adopts and then exploits the boxological model of imaginative pretense put forth by Nichols and Stich.[5] The central idea is that in the mind there are boxes with attitudes in them. A belief that p goes in the belief box. A desire that q goes in the desire box. An attitude regarding something fictional goes in the possible worlds box. A picture of their account would have at least the three boxes: belief, desire, and possible worlds. An "UpDater" handles updating beliefs as new information becomes available. It handles the content of pretense the same way, and it also handles moving the contents of the belief and possible worlds boxes back and forth. Beliefs and desires then input into a decision-making system, and then an action-control system, and then behavior is output. See Figure 1 for a diagram of their model.[6] On Kampa's account, imaginative transportation takes place when one shifts one's attention away from the belief box and to the possible worlds box. He keeps Nichols and Stich's cognitive architecture. For Kampa, the process of imaginative transportation is found in occurrent belief. While pretending that $\neg p$, one can occurrently believe that p. But while one

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2. Kampa, "Imaginative Transportation," 7.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., 6–7.
5. Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich, "A Cognitive Theory of Pretense," *Cognition* 74 (2000): 115–147.
6. Ibid., 125–128.

Figure 1: Nichols and Stich's theory of pretense as in Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich, "A Cognitive Theory of Pretense," *Cognition* 74 (2000): 128.

is in a case of imaginative transportation with cognitive content $\neg p$, one cannot occurrently believe that p. This is a difference in cognitive attention.[7]

In this paper, I argue that palief does not adequately capture imaginative transportation. First, I argue contra Kampa that the existing cognitive architecture is in fact inadequate for imaginative transportation. To remedy this, I introduce a self box. Second, I defend half-belief against Kampa's argument and then make a positive case for it using the self box architecture.

2   The Need for a Self Box

After presenting the cases of Sandra, Meredith, and John, Kampa says that the three are all "in roughly the same sort of state."[8] By the end, he distinguishes Sandra the reader from the other two. Her imaginative transportation is further specified as aesthetic transportation. The other two's imaginative transportation is performative transportation. Performative transportation is distinguished from aesthetic transportation by its involving action. Sandra does not act on Frankenstein's monster's thoughts and feelings. She only thinks and feels.

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7. Kampa, "Imaginative Transportation," 9–10.
8. Ibid., 2.

Meredith and John are responding to being a drug smuggler and Don Giovanni with actions in addition to thoughts and feelings. The two kinds of imaginative transportation are similar in that both require a shift from attending to one's normal thoughts and feelings to attending to thoughts and feelings appropriate to the story.[9]

However, the two kinds of imaginative transportation have a deeper difference. In cases of aesthetic transportation, the transported consciousness is unreflective. In cases of performative transportation, reflective consciousness is allowed. What I mean here by reflective is consciousness with consciousness as its object. So for example, if Sandra takes a moment of consciousness as her object of consciousness, she snaps out of focus. Her continued engagement with the story relies on her unreflective focus. Her consciousness takes Frankenstein's monster, the forthcoming events of the plot, and other story elements as objects, but nothing of her own consciousness. In other words, her thought is entirely extrospective, and her concept of herself is uninvolved. In contrast, Meredith may have to bring herself into focus. She has to decide what she is going to do. That is, she has to decide what Meredith is going to do. So she has to reflect. What she does requires some introspective thought and de se attitudes.[10] Reflective attention therefore needs to be included in an accurate account of the distinction between aesthetic and performative transportation.

Reflective attention does not obviously fit within the existing architecture. There are already reflective attitudes in the beliefs, desires, and possible worlds boxes. I believe that *I* am wearing a sweatshirt. I desire that *I* take a drink of water. I can pretend or consider counterfactually, i.e. an attitude in the possible worlds box, that *I* have an extra pair of arms. One may disagree with the propositional structure and therefore the self-orientation of any of these three kinds of cognitive content, but then the introduction of a self box does not overlap problematically with the existing boxes anyway. So we only need to be concerned if

9. Kampa, "Imaginative Transportation," 11–12.

10. See also Peter J. Burke, "Relationships among Multiple Identities," in *Advances in Identity Theory and Research*, ed. Peter J. Burke et al. (New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2003) for evidence that one's self-identity influences one's performance. This evidence only indicates influence, rather than a need for identity in deliberation, but it does at least show identity plays some sort of role in performance.

there is problematic overlap. That is, the possible objection I must deal with here is that the contents of the self box belong in the boxes Nichols and Stich already put forth. However, there already appears to be a sort of overlap between the belief box and possible worlds box. Presumably, one can have beliefs about what things would be like given some fictional premises. Then things can be inferred from the adopted belief. Nichols and Stich point out that if the cognitive contents of pretense are not in a different box from regular beliefs, then nothing discriminates between the two. Then someone is stuck actually believing all the things they were pretending.[11] If having the reflective attitudes mixed in with the rest in the three standard boxes without problem, then my defense will not work. However, the deep difference between the two kinds of imaginative transportation shows that indeed some discrimination between reflective and nonreflective attitudes is needed.

One may object still that the needs to keep possible worlds out of beliefs is different from the need to sort out reflective and nonreflective attitudes as the attitudes may themselves be flagged as reflective or nonreflective and therefore not be at risk of being mistaken for each other. However, the concept of self is what distinguishes Sandra reading about Frankenstein's monster from her acting out the monster. Nichols and Stich handle a similar objection, that all pretense attitudes are just beliefs that one is pretending something. They draw a parallel to desire, noting that there are beliefs that one is desiring something, i.e. beliefs of the form "I desire (that) p." However, because one need not have the concept of desire to desire, the beliefs of desires are unnecessary for desire, so desires are not just beliefs, and so the desire box is distinct from the belief box. Because one does not need to be able to believe that they are pretending to pretend, i.e. have beliefs of the form "I am pretending that p" the possible worlds box is defended in the same way.[12] And because one does not need to have beliefs of the form "I believe I am such that p" to consider oneself as such that p,[13] the self box can be defended in this way, too.

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11. Nichols and Stich, "A Cognitive Theory of Pretense," 132–133.
12. Ibid., 137–138.
13. I.e. one does not need a robust concept of "I" to start having a personality.

In cases of aesthetic transportation, a crucial element of what the transported individual is doing is ignoring the self box inasmuch as the self box is about oneself. For example, as Sandra is transported by *Frankenstein*, she is also ignoring Sandra's self box. She is also ignoring Frankenstein's monster's self box. In contrast, Meredith must give a lot of focus to a self box. Her project is essentially self-oriented inasmuch as the self as an object of attention can be altered and is important for volition. The self box is important for volition as to move oneself one needs some awareness of oneself. For Meredith to decide "Now I will go sell these drugs," she must have her self in mind that will be selling the drugs. Sandra does not engage in such reflection. At no point in her reading does she need to think about herself.

How the self box might be altered is less clear. Let us consider Meredith's case again. Perhaps her self-concept actually changes. Some things in the self box are removed, and other things are added. Alternatively, perhaps she acquires a second self box and shifts her attention between the two. This is the closest option to Kampa's account, as he might include it as a special kind of possible worlds box. A third option is she creates the second self box, and over time the two boxes meld together. I will argue in favor of this third option.[14] To do so, I will add one more character to our cast.

Consider Wes. Wes recently changed jobs. In his old job, he was allowed to be crude and took full advantage of the allowance. His new job has him in a setting in which he has more a more stringent code of conduct to conform to. In an effort to fit in and keep his new job, Wes adheres to the code of conduct and seems to take on an entirely new persona. When he begins the new job, keeping up the persona requires active effort. As soon as he leaves work, he resumes swearing and making crass remarks. But in the office he acts in accordance with the professional expectations and even verbally affirms the value of the norms. After a

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14. One may object here that the boxological model is supposed to have a static number of boxes, so people cannot be creating new boxes every time they are involved in imaginative transportation. Indeed, Kampa, following Nichols and Stich, talks about a possible worlds box only in the singular for any individual person. If one wants to preserve the fixity of the number of boxes, then one could replace every instance in which I talk about multiple self boxes with a similar talk about partitions within a single box.

few months, Wes reflects. He realizes that over the past few months, he's been swearing a lot less. His apartment is tidier, and he is less insulting to those around him. Some of his home character has also crept into the office. While initially he stayed far away from any profanity, now he lets the occasional "hell" slip without thinking anything of it.

Wes's case supports my third option for the self box changing: a new box is acquired and then melds into the original. I will now show Wes's case is indeed one of imaginative transportation. I do this by showing it is similar enough to Meredith and John's cases. Then I will show the other two explanations for self box changes are inadequate while the third is adequate. Then I will argue that Kampa's three examples are also best explained my way.

Wes originally just played a character at the office. In this he is similar to Meredith. After a while of playing the character, he forgets. If he reflects, he can see that this is occurring. This is, again, similar to Meredith. Wes is also similar to John as John also creates a character. In early rehearsals, he likely has a major leap from John to Don Giovanni. By the opening night of the play, the transition is much closer to seamless. Of course, John's Don Giovanni is not the same as anyone else's Don Giovanni. Some of John's character creeps into John's Don Giovanni's character. John, too, is unlikely to be left unchanged by having played Don Giovanni. Wes's case is more extreme but understandably so. John has a clear indicator of when to become Don Giovanni and when to become John. Wes has an indication of when to put on his office character, but the boundaries are a bit blurrier. The repetition and time investment also leaves more room for Wes to change his home self. That his office character functions alright outside the office makes staying in character that much easier. Wes can be polite anywhere. John would have a lot of problems if he was Don Giovanni everywhere. Wes's case is thus indeed one of imaginative transportation.

Now turn to which explanation of the self box changing best fits Wes's case. Option one, he has one self box that changes, fails at the initial stage of the story. Unless our boxology allows for rapid removal of a bunch of attitudes, putting a bunch of things into the box, and then later undoing this, this option is unavailable. If one is willing to have such a

boxology, one is still left without an explanation of the slow seeping of the two characters together. Option two, Wes creates a new box for a new character for work. This option fixes the problem of rapid emptying and filling of a box. The problem with merely switching attention between the two is, again, a lack of explanation for the seeping of the two character together. One might object Wes could be moving items between the boxes, but that would require Wes have some self beyond the self box. This leaves the third option. He does create the character and play it. When he reflects, he reflects to the character he created. But his sense of self is unstable between two boxes. They must ultimately be porous at the boundary between the two.

The two-porous-box option also fits the self box changing for John and Meredith. Both are more extreme cases of transportation, so their self boxes meld more slowly. John becomes Don Giovanni for only relatively short periods of time. John and Don Giovanni are also very different selves, so the two are understandably more resistant to melding. John is himself far more detailed a person than Don Giovanni. John can handle and has been in a huge number of circumstances while Don Giovanni embodied in John has far more limited experience. Even while John can imagine Don Giovanni having a more extensive past, the more extensive past will still be lacking compared with the level of detail that John's own past has. Meredith is more liable to take on characteristics of her criminal persona since she takes on that role for longer periods of time and has fewer cues to return to being regular Meredith. How easily Meredith and her criminal persona meld is also determined in part by how much of Meredith is imported into the persona. While Don Giovanni is almost entirely distinct from John, Meredith can reasonably use features of her own personality and her own past to construct the persona. If she imports a lot of herself into the persona, then the two are more similar to begin with and so have an easier time coming together. This is most apparent in the case of Wes. He imports almost everything to create his work persona. He then has the easiest time of accidentally becoming the work self outside of work or letting his nonwork self from the start creep in at work. As described, the two may ultimately come

together into a compromise somewhere between them. The difference between the three is then more of degree than kind.

One may wonder whether this seeping of identities happens. A study by Amiot, et al., looked at the changing identities of new college students. When the students first started, they were surveyed on several factors, including factors of well-being and social identity. After four months they were surveyed again to see how much they changed. The results indicated that the new social situation that they were in had changed their identity. When one sublimates to better function in a new social situation, as Wes does, a new social identity is forged.[15] A second study by the same group introduced several people into an unfamiliar online gaming community. The changes were less remarkable, but the change also had less impact on their lives. Starting college is usually a much bigger change in one's life than playing a new video game, so the adaptations are also bigger. Nonetheless, the changes exist in both. However, the starker the contrasts are between what one did before and after taking on the new social role, the more resistant one is to changing identity. Threats to one's original identities inhibit the development of a new identity.[16] Wes's new identity is a major change, though not threatening to his original identities. He can remain the crude man he was before getting the new job. He just has to adopt a few norms for several hours a day. He can and does actually live out the identities harmoniously. Meredith is more resistant to change because being a criminal deeply threatens her being an agent of law enforcement.

Further research by Peter Burke further supports both that the two porous boxes model is the best of the three and also that Wes's identity (self box) change is similar to Meredith and John's with explainable differences. Burke's study examines people for three years, checking in yearly, rather than four months, and the identity changes grow over the years.[17] We see this in our three characters as Wes's identity change takes a while to happen, Meredith finds herself slipping into her criminal identity more as the operation goes on, and John hardly

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15. Catherine E. Amiot et al., "Changes in Social Identities Over Time: The Role of Coping and Adaptation Processes," *British Journal of Social Psychology* 49 (2010): 803–826.

16. Ibid.

17. Peter J. Burke, "Identity Change," *Social Psychology Quarterly* 69, no. 1 (2006): 91–92.

gets a chance to become Don Giovanni.

On Burke's theory, identity change involves changes in self-meaning. That is, as one's identity changes, one's understanding of who one is individually and socially changes. They give us a standard for judging our place in situations we find ourselves in. And, as his study supports, they are resistant to change, giving us stability in our self-understandings.[18] We see these claims hold true for our characters. Wes's new job gives him an understanding of himself as a professional. With this understanding, he comes to judge his swearing as inappropriate in many situations. As Burke explains, his identity (self) interprets the world.[19] Wes's home self gives an unobtrusive meaning to swearing, while his professional self gives it a more offensive meaning. Meredith's criminal identity lets her figure out how to act as a criminal just as John's Don Giovanni identity lets him figure out how to act as a libertine. The resistance to change allows Meredith to not irrevocably slip into being a criminal and John not to slide directly into becoming Don Giovanni all the time. So, the self boxes are porous, but movement between the two boxes is resisted. The resistance, as we have seen, depends on factors including the severity of change and harmoniousness between the identities.[20] Burke goes on to say that new identities, i.e. new self boxes, "create potential changes in other identities." Moreover, rather than just the original identity changing to function alongside the new one or vice versa, all identities come together. Burke explains this via a need for common meaning.[21] Thus the movement between boxes is motivated by a need for harmony but resisted for the sake of stability. Unlike with pretense where the attitudes are abandoned, cases of imaginative transportation and other identity changes have persistent attitudes. Long-term objectives and projects can be had. Self boxes persisting also allows for the interaction between them. Pretenses not persisting after attention is lost

18. Burke, "Identity Change," 92.
19. Burke, "Relationships among Multiple Identities," 211.
20. There are extreme cases that can rapidly and radically alter one's self box, such as a house fire or plane crash. As shown in Peter J. Burke and Alicia D. Cast, "Stability and Change in the Gender Identities of Newly Married Couples," *Social Psychology Quarterly* 68 (1997): 359–374, "identities change when self-relevant meanings in the situation alter irrevocably."
21. Burke, "Identity Change," 93–94.

doesn't allow them to have the same sort of influence on each other that self-identities have.[22]

Finally, to further illustrate the role of the self box, consider a day Wes is at work in his first month and the fire alarm goes off. Upon being startled by the loud sound, he shouts an expletive and slams his mug into his desk, breaking it. This is unlike his work self and more like his original home self, but he is at work. However, being his work self requires effort to attend to. Startling him with a loud sound understandably pulls him out of focus, so he reverts for a moment into his original home self. On the other hand, if four years have passed and his vocabulary for both selves (if they are still separate enough to distinguish) has merged away from expletives, then being startled won't prompt him to swear.

3   Imaginative Transportation as Half-Belief

In refuting half-belief as imaginative transportation, Kampa says that John doesn't believe he is Don Giovanni. Explicitly, he says, "the fact is that he doesn't [ever] believe he is Don Giovanni."[23] The argument goes that half-belief requires belief sometimes and nonbelief other times. However, John never believes he is Don Giovanni. This brings up two further problems. The first is that what the antecedent of the pronoun "he" is is not clear. The second is that what it is to believe oneself is Don Giovanni is unclear.

3.1   John believes who is Don Giovanni?

Saying "John believes he is Don Giovanni" has a few possible meanings. The word "he" could be replaced with "John" or "Don Giovanni". The latter option can be discounted because it's trivially true and not relevant in the context of whether John believes he, whatever "he"

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22. Regarding identity (self box) change when multiple identities interact, see also Burke, "Relationships among Multiple Identities," Kay Deaux, "Personalizing Identity and Socializing Self," in *Social Psychology of Identity and the Self-Concept*, ed. Glynis M. Blackwell (London: Surrey University Press, 1992), Kay Deaux, "Reconstructing Social Identity," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 19 (1993): 4–12, and Jan E. Stets, "Role Identities and Person Identities: Gender Identity, Master Identity, and Controlling One's Partner," *Sociological Perspectives* 38 (1995): 129–150.

23. Kampa, "Imaginative Transportation," 6.

is, is Don Giovanni. The first option fits neatly into Kampa's argument. John indeed does not believe John is Don Giovanni. If he believed "John" and "Don Giovanni" picked out exactly the same things, then his acting as Don Giovanni would be identical to his acting as John.

A third option is that "John" is being used in a similar way to "that guy" would be if he were physically present. If we were sitting in the audience as John performed, then I could point to him and say "That guy believes he is Don Giovanni." However, for the sake of writing an account in textual form, some other signifier is needed. "John" is a natural choice. After the play is over, if we run into John on the street I could say, "That guy believes he is John." This substitution fits better because the goal is to somehow pick out a person and then describe who the person is. The phrasing "John believes John is Don Giovanni" fails to distinguish John the person and John the who the person is. To make the point clearer, consider someone, Paul, in a fugue state. Paul has no recollection of his life as Paul. He instead believes that he is Jerry Seinfeld. One could say "Paul believes he is Jerry Seinfeld," and the "that guy" substitution I advocate would clearly capture the meaning. But "Paul believes Paul is Jerry Seinfeld" would not work because Paul has no concept of Paul. Paul in fact believes "Jerry Seinfeld is Jerry Seinfeld" and that "Jerry Seinfeld" picks out himself.[24]

So, John believing he is Don Giovanni is neither obviously true nor false, and the same holds for John not believing he is Don Giovanni. To figure this out, an exploration of what it is to believe one is Don Giovanni is needed.

3.2   What it is to believe oneself is Don Giovanni?

John (that guy) speaks and acts like he believes he is Don Giovanni. Upon reflection, he is conscious of himself as Don Giovanni. Perhaps some sort of persistence over a long period

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24. See also John Perry, "Myself and I," in *Philosophie in Synthetischer Absicht*, ed. Marcelo Stamm (1998), 83–103. Perry handles primarily the usual cases of self-knowledge. He distinguishes first-personal and third-personal forms of self-knowledge. John's belief that he is (not) Don Giovanni comes into play as both. On the third-personal side, we have this "That guy is Don Giovanni" story. On the first-personal side, we see the need for John to believe he is Don Giovanni as at certain points in his performance he will think "Don Giovanni needs to ϕ now" and also recognize that "Don Giovanni" is him so that he will ϕ.

of time is built into the belief. This at least explains why we find it more natural to refer to him as John rather than Don Giovanni. If he spent most of his days talking and acting like Don Giovanni and only being John for limited intervals of time, we would be asking what it is for Don Giovanni to believe he is John. If persistence is the condition, then John cannot believe he is Don Giovanni because his reflections don't involve his being such years ago or years into the future. That seems wrong as he could choose to add those into the character. One may object that Don Giovanni is fixed by the script and existing story, but at least John could create a very similar character also called Don Giovanni. For effective acting, he may actually do so as the more fleshed out a character's story is, the more believable a character they can be.

Perhaps instead the important thing in John believing he is John but not believing he is Don Giovanni is his ability to snap out of being Don Giovanni back to being John. Since he can find his way back to being John, he must not really believe he is Don Giovanni. Yet, when he is John, he can find his way back to being Don Giovanni, so this criterion leaves him not believing he is John, either. While if someone yells "Fire!" he is likely to abandon Don Giovanni and run out of the building as John, if the director declares, "Action!" he abandons John and leers as Don Giovanni. This solution then seems vulnerable to a symmetry where there should be an asymmetry.

I propose the following: John believing he is Don Giovanni is a relation between the belief box and the self box. His believing he is not Don Giovanni is a different relation between the belief box and the self box. The details of the relation could take one of several forms. If the UpDater pulls Don Giovanni information from the self box, then he believes he is Don Giovanni. If the UpDater does not pull substantial Don Giovanni information from the self box, but does pull information of an identity that is not Don Giovanni, then he believes he is not Don Giovanni. Beliefs can lead one to need to switch which self is the self at a given moment, and that takes the form of picking out of a different self box.

Given this model seems to fit, what we have is a sort of half-belief ascribed to that guy.

While John believes he is John and Don Giovanni believes he is Don Giovanni, which self is active varies over time. So, that guy believes he is John sometimes and believes he is Don Giovanni sometimes. This is half-belief.

This picture of half-belief is still perniciously symmetrical. Like how the fire alarm makes Wes swear in his first month of his new job, the fire alarm going off will reliably have John or Don Giovanni respond as John. Again the attention and associated effort in acting from the new identity is distracted by being startled. The need for effort can be explained by a degree of correspondence between contents of either self box and the belief box. Most of John's beliefs fit well with his being John. Most of them do not fit with his being Don Giovanni. So, he has to exert effort to be Don Giovanni despite the conflicting beliefs. Likewise Wes's beliefs, initially, fit with his original, cruder self. He believes language codes are stupid, so a self that speaks freely is a better fit. The professionalized Wes is a worse fit, so he must exert effort until the two boxes come together, updating the belief box along the way.

4   Conclusion

Kampa describes a mental phenomenon that is similar in some ways to but importantly different from pretense. While he tries to keep the cognitive architecture put forward by Nichols and Stich, an additional box for reflective attitudes is needed to adequately capture imaginative transportation. While Kampa's notion of palief adequately captures many features of imaginative transportation, it has trouble distinguishing aesthetic and performative transportation. We can introduce a self box to aid in these cases as well as more subtle cases of people purposefully acting differently at times and becoming the persona they create. With this architecture we can see that imaginative transportation is in fact a variety of half-belief. The half-belief is special in that one half requires effort while the other does not. The effort does not need to be conscious, and in fact consciously trying often gets in the way of imaginative transportation. But, there is a tension between a great part of the

belief box and one self box that enables an easier transition back to one's original self.

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